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Abstract 
This paper exams the role of media in seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) price and market 
reactions on SEO announcements. Using a sample of SEO deals in UK, we find that media 
coverage is significantly and negatively related to SEO price discounts and market returns around 
SEO announcements. Moreover, we document that more pessimistic media sentiment predicts 
larger SEO price discounts and more negative market reactions to SEO announcements. In 
summary, both media coverage and media sentiment influence investor decisions in SEOs, but 
through different mechanism.  
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I. Introduction 
As one of the most important channels for information dissemination, media coverage 
has been shown to be able to assist in reducing information asymmetry between the firm 
and investors. Even if media does not supply genuine news, higher media coverage still 
lowers stock’s required rate of return by raising the awareness and demand of a stock 
among investors (e.g. Huberman and Regev, 2001; Barber and Odean 2008; Fang and 
Peress, 2009; Da et al. 2011). Meanwhile, media sentiment impacts investor expectations 
and thus has prediction power on future aggregate market returns (Tetlock 2007; Garcia, 
2013). The impacts of media on asset pricing have been documented in various scenarios 
such as IPOs (Cook et al., 2006), bubbles (Bhattacharya et al., 2009), recessions (Garcia, 
2013), corporate governance (Dyck et al., 2008), and earnings announcement (Peress, 
2008). However, no prior literature has investigated whether media plays a role in seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs). SEO represents the most important equity financing channel for 
publicly listed firms. The price discounts and the adverse price reactions of SEOs reflect 
the implicit costs for the issuing firms (e.g. Barnes and Walker, 2006; Armitage et al., 2014). 
One way to reduce such costs is to enhance the efficiency of information dissemination to 
the investors. The objective of this paper is to investigate whether and how media affects 
the implicit costs during SEO issues.  
We exam whether and to what extent media helps issuing firms reduce the implicit 
costs in SEOs from two aspects. Our first line of inquiry examines whether mass media 
results in lower price discounts. As prior literature (e.g., Cook et al., 2006; Da et al., 2011) 
points out that media coverage attracts additional investors’ attention and alleviates 
information fraction among investors and thereby higher demand of new shares, we expect 
that media coverage decreases price discounts in SEOs, even without necessarily revealing 
any value-relevant information. Different from news quantity, news content changes 
investor behaviour through influencing investor sentiment and affects their valuation on the 
stock (Gurun and Butler, 2012). Therefore, we expect negative news contents leads to 
investor pessimism and results in higher price discounts in SEOs. 
Our second line of inquiry examines whether media affects the negative value effect on 
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SEO announcements. SEO announcements are often perceived as a signal of overvaluation 
and information asymmetry, resulting in unexpected negative announcement returns. High 
media coverage attracts investor attention to the adverse information signalled by SEO 
announcements. Therefore, we expect that media coverage would amplify market’s adverse 
reaction towards SEO announcements. On the other hand, media content affects market 
reactions on SEO announcements in a different mechanism. Positive news generates run-up 
in stock prices (Engelberg et al., 2012; Ahern and Sosyura, 2014), which may mitigate the 
negative market reactions to SEO announcements, while negative news further pressure 
down the stock prices and thus causes even more negative reactions to SEO 
announcements.   
Different from prior studies (e.g. Cook et al., 2006; Ferris et al., 2013; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2013; Liu et al., 2014), our analysis is conducted in the setting of UK SEOs 
instead of US IPOs for the following considerations. First, SEO is a more strict setting to 
investigate media’s influence on investors. SEO firms have longer listing histories, with 
more value-relevant information regularly disclosed and embedded in stock price. Since 
investors timely observe information in stock price from the secondary market, investors 
are less likely to be influenced by a large amount of compounding new information 
disclosed by issuers during SEOs compared with IPOs. Second, UK SEO is a clearer 
setting than US SEO because of the different SEO pricing mechanism in UK (Slovin et al., 
2000). In the US, after SEC approval of the offering, the price range and offer size can be 
adjusted in response to the demand information, such as market reactions to SEO 
announcements, gathered by the underwriter since SEO initial announcement date till the 
actual issue date. In comparison, offer price and size are definitive at the initial 
announcement in the UK. Underwriters use only pre-announcement information to 
determine offer price and size (Slovin et al., 2000). Therefore, the special characteristics of 
the British SEO enable us to investigate the causality effect of media on SEO pricing by 
excluding the possible secondary market feedback effects on SEO pricing after the initial 
announcements. 
Considering the features of UK SEO, our analysis focuses on the media news during a 
period starting from 30 days until 2 days prior to the announcement date, defined as the 
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pre-SEO period. We construct two sets of media measures: 1) media coverage, which is the 
summative amount of media news covering the SEO issuer (e.g., Fang and Peress, 2009; Liu 
et al., 2014); and 2) media sentiment, which is evaluated according to the linguistic content of 
media articles, and calculated as the average of the ratio of negative words minus positive 
words to total words for all related articles in the pre-SEO period (e.g. Garcia 2013).  
When examining the link between media coverage and SEO pricing, we use an 
instrumental variable approach to control for potential endogeneity concern. To satisfy the 
exclusion restriction, we use the occurrence of newspaper strike as the instrument. It is a 
binary variable that equals one if newspaper related strike occurs during a period of [-30, -2] 
days prior to the SEO announcement date.1 The idea is that, newspaper strike is a 
disruption in media outlet for exogenous reasons, which should be independent of SEO 
issuers’ characteristics. We report both the results estimated from OLS and those from 
2SLS using instrumental variable in media coverage tests.We find strong evidence that 
media coverage and sentiment affect firms' issue pricing. We document a significantly 
negative correlation between pre-SEO media coverage and the discounts of the SEO offer 
price in both the OLS model and instrumental variable approach. Moreover, we find that 
issuers covered by more pessimistic news reports are likely to be traded at larger discounts.  
Second, we document that media coverage and news sentiment have significant impacts 
on how market reacts to SEO announcements. Particularly, we find higher media coverage 
exaggerate the adverse effects of SEO announcements on stock price, in both OLS and 
instrumental variable approach. However, more positive news sentiment mitigates the 
negative market reaction to SEO announcements. 
The present paper offers new insights to the recent emerging literature on the role of 
media playing in financial markets from at least three aspects. Firstly, we document the 
influences of media in SEOs. While prior literature primarily focuses on the role of media 
in IPOs (e.g., Cook et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2009), our paper is the first study showing that 
media significantly affects price discounts in SEOs, which is the most important channel of 
equity financing for listed firms. Compared to IPO, SEO is a cleaner setting to investigate 
                                                 
1 The information of newspaper strike is manually collected from the UK LexisNexis.  
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the influence of media, as value-relevant information from other channels are timely 
embedded in the stock price and thus more likely to be publicly known. Moreover, by using 
the UK setting, where offer price and issue size are fixed after the initial announcements, 
we are able to eliminate the possibility of firm learning from the market responses to SEO 
announcements and adjust offer price before the actual issue date. Secondly, we 
simultaneously consider media coverage and news content, both of which affect asset 
pricing but through different mechanisms. While media coverage affects capital market 
through investor attention grabbing, news content influences investor sentiment and 
changes public opinion. Finally, our analysis reveals that the impacts of the media, either 
media coverage or media content, on market response to SEO announcements tends to be 
persistent in a relatively long window, which is more consistent with the argument of media 
facilitating investor information processing rather than biasing investor reaction. 
   The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II establishes the arguments 
underlying the main hypotheses by reviewing the related literature. Section III describes the 
sample selection and variable constructions. Section IV discusses summary statistics and the 
main findings from the empirical analysis. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. Theoretical Background, Related Literature and Hypotheses 
A. The Media and SEO Price Discounts 
Prior literature has shown that media disseminates information, alleviates information 
asymmetry between investors, and grabs investors’ attention, which ultimately affect 
investors trading decisions and their required rate of return. Merton (1987) argues investors 
hold incomplete information regarding the available stocks, and thus are more likely to buy 
and hold stocks that have recently attracted their attention, which is supported by a number 
of empirical studies. Barber and Odean (2008) confirm that individual investors are the net 
buyers of stocks covered by the news. Fang and Peress (2009) and Tetlock (2010) find that 
stocks not covered by the media earn significantly higher returns than those heavily covered 
by the media. Such "no media premium" indicates that the breadth of information 
dissemination can create investor awareness and hence generate investor buying behavior, 
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resulting in a lower cost of capital. Using Google search volume as the proxy for individual 
investor attention, Da et al. (2010) also find that the investor attention is positively related to 
the short-run stock performance. Ahern and Sosyura (2014) exam how bidders manage 
media coverage to induce a temporary run-up in stock during the period when the stock 
exchange ratio is determined during merger negations. Huberman and Regev (2001) points 
out that spurious publicity is no less important to stock pricing than risk. More importantly, 
media’s influences on capital market through attention grabbing can be spurious publicity, 
and remains even without genuine information (Huberman and Regev, 2001; Liu et al., 
2014). 
In the scenario of the price setting of SEOs, investor attention is one of the identified 
determinants (Liu et al., 2009; Duffie, 2010), among other factors such as asymmetric 
information (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Ritter and Welch, 2002), and opinions 
discrepancy among investors (Miller, 1977; Hong and Stein, 2007). High media coverage 
raises the publicity and improves investors’ awareness of the SEO issuer. In addition, high 
media coverage efficiently facilitates the dissemination of firm-specific information to the 
financial market, and thus alleviates the information asymmetry concern between investors. 
Therefore, high media coverage increases the demand of the new shares. Consistent with 
this, Cook et al. (2006) find that higher publicity is positively associated with offer price in 
IPOs. Therefore, we predict that media coverage during pre-SEO period is negatively 
related to SEO pricing discounts.2 
Media coverage, i.e. the news quantity, is not the only channel through which media 
affects capital market. Prior studies have also documented that news contents affect 
investor sentiment and expectations. Tetlock (2007) explores the daily content from the 
news in The Wall Street Journal using textual analysis and finds that media content affects 
investor sentiment and can predict market prices and trading volume. Tetlock (2007) refers 
to the Harvard Psychosocial Dictionary to classify pessimistic words in each media article 
and obtains each article's news attitude, which he labels as “media pessimism”. Garcia (2013) 
                                                 
2 We do not exclude the possibility that media brings new information to the financial market and reduce the information 
asymmetry between the issuer and investors, which also leads to a reduction in SEO price discounts. However, Tetlock 
(2007) fail to find consistent results with theories of media content as a proxy for new information. Moreover, new 
information is not a necessary condition for media’s influence on capital market. Therefore, our prediction about media’s 
influence on SEOs does not depend on whether media news brings private information into the market.  
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further shows that “media pessimism” has predictive power for daily stock returns, 
particularly in times of recession. Solomon (2012) finds that firms generate more positive 
news on purpose to raise investor expectations and improve announcement returns. In the 
setting of SEOs, we predict that more negative contents contained in news reports during 
pre-SEO period leads to higher SEO pricing discounts. 
 
B.  The Media and Market Reactions to SEO Announcements 
The attention grabbing of media coverage also facilitates investors’ information 
processing. Bernard and Thomas (1989) shows that delay in the response to earnings 
reports is more likely to be the explanation for post-earnings-announcement-drift than risk 
mismeasurement. And Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) documents that investors’ inattention 
leads to underreactions and more delayed responses to earnings announcement. Hong and 
Stein (1999) argue that the gradual diffusion of private information among investors help to 
explain investors’ short-term underreaction. This financial market friction caused by limited 
attention can be alleviated by media’s information dissemination, as both Peress (2016) and 
Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) find that firm announcements with higher media coverage 
trigger stronger immediate price and trading volume reaction, along with less subsequent 
drift. 
Based on the arguments above, we expect that high investor attention brought by high 
media coverage before the SEO announcements would exaggerate market reactions around 
SEO announcements. Given that market usually consider SEO as a bad signal on firm value 
and previous studies document an average negative market reaction around SEO 
announcements (e.g., Armitage et al. 2014; Barnes and Walker, 2006; Bradley and Yuan, 
2013), we propose that media coverage during the pre-SEO period is negatively related to 
SEO announcement returns. 
We also consider the effect of news content on SEO announcement returns. While 
positive news may induce optimistic investor sentiment and thus neutralize the negative 
signalling effect of SEO announcements, negative news will become an amplifier of the 
announcements and further pressure down firm valuation. Therefore, we predict that more 
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negative contents contained in news reports during pre-SEO period leads to lower SEO 
announcement returns. 
 
III. Data and Variable Constructions  
A. Data 
We obtained all UK common stock SEOs between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 
2010 from the Thomson One Banker database. We chose this sample period because of the 
data availability for all variables and to have a sample period after the regulatory change that 
occurred in 1996, when the London Stock Exchange (LSE) relaxed the rules on the 
maximum size of a placing issue.3 The number of placing issues among all UK SEOs has 
grown significantly after 1996, when offer size is no longer constrained by issue type 
(Barnes and Walker, 2006). 
Our analysis solely considers non-financial and non-utility issuer stocks listed on the 
LSE, i.e. we exclude all firms with SIC codes between 6000-6999 and 4900-4949. The 
initial sample contains 4,674 SEO deals. In accordance with Slovin et al. (2000), we exclude 
pure secondary and joint issues because large shareholders and insiders can sell a portion of 
their stock holdings in secondary offerings, leaving a sample of 3,590 deals. We further 
require the SEO proceeds to be over £1 million, resulting in a sample size of 2,457 deals. 
To identify issue characteristics, we collected the following terms of each offer: the 
announcement date, the offer price, the offer amount, the issue type and the name of the 
book runners. The number of deals with complete issue information reduces to 1,663. The 
daily stock price data are obtained from DataStream, including the closing market price prior 
to the announcement day, on the offer day, and on the first trading day after the issue. The 
firms’ financial data are also got from DataStream. The ownership information is obtained 
from Thomson One bank. The information of analyst recommendations and earning 
announcements is derived from IBES. After merging SEO deals with ownership data, 
financial data and analyst recommendations, our final sample consists of 377 deals.  
                                                 
3 Prior to 1990, a maximum monetary value of £3million was imposed by the LSE on the total value of shares being placed. 
A higher ceiling of £15 million applied to the period 1990-1995. In January 1996, all size limitations were effectively 
removed, paving the way for an unconstrained choice of issue methods by publicly listed firms (Barnes and Walker, 2006). 
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B. Construction of Media Variables 
To obtain the media data for each firm, we searched media articles related to SEO issuers 
in the LexisNexis UK database. We only focus on media news published in the Financial 
Times (London), The Times (London), the Guardian (London), the Mirror, and the Sunday 
Mirror. The search window starts from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2010.  
These media sources are selected for three reasons. First, these are the five most 
influential newspapers with extremely large circulations, over 6.6 million daily readerships 
in total. In particular, the Financial Times is a finance-oriented newspaper, with an average 
daily readership of 2.1 million. The other newspapers also have dedicated sections for 
international business and financial news. Second, these newspapers all have a long history4 
and thus these publications have strong reputations and credibility for all types of investors. 
Third, the competition among these five newspapers leads to lower media bias (Gentzkow 
and Shapiro, 2010). Additionally, due to the long history and strong influence of these 
newspapers, the electronic text of their news reports is accessible from the LexisNexis UK 
database during our sample period. 
Our key measurements of media include media coverage and media sentiment. The 
variable to measure media coverage is Coverage, calculated as the number of news articles 
covering an issuer during the pre-SEO period. Following Fang and Peress (2009) and Liu et 
al. (2014), we define the pre-SEO period as a window over [-30,-2], where Day0 refers to 
SEO announcement day. We only calculate media coverage and media sentiment for SEO 
deals covered by news. As a supplement, we construct an indicator for all SEO deals, i.e. 
News(-30,-2), which is an indicator of the news existence that equals one for the SEOs 
covered by media news during the pre-SEO period.    
As for media sentiment, we construct a variable (Sentiment) by quantifying the content 
of media articles. Using the classification method by Loughran and McDonald (2011), we 
capture business-specific positive and negative words from each media article. Following 
                                                 
4 For example, the Financial Times was founded in 1888; The Times was established in 1785; the Guardian in 1821; and the 
Mirror and the Sunday Mirror in 1930 and 1915, respectively. 
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Garcia (2013), the measure of media sentiment is calculated as: 
Sentiment (per Article) = (Number of Negative Words – Number of Positive Words) / Total 
Number of Words  
A higher Sentiment indicates a more pessimistic attitude of a news article. For each SEO, 
media sentiment is calculated as the mean of the sentiment per article during the 
pre-announcement period. 
 
C. Instrumental Variable for Media Coverage 
One challenge to establish evidence of a causal role of the media in SEO pricing and 
market response is that media coverage is likely to be endogenous - the change in firm 
characteristics may attract the media attention, which simultaneously influences SEO price 
setting and market response. We use an instrumental variable approach to address this 
endogeneity issue.  
The instrument variable we adopt is NewspaperStrike, a dummy variable that equals 
one if the newspaper related strike occurs during a period of [-30,-2] days prior to offer 
announcement date. The strike information is manually collected from UK LexisNexis.5 
Newspaper strikes directly reduce the human capital in news reporting and thus the press 
coverage, while not correlated with firm characteristics. And therefore, it is likely to satisfy 
the necessary exclusion restriction.  
 
D. Control Variables 
Drawing from the existing study on the determinants of SEO price setting and market 
response to announcements (e.g. Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Huang and 
Zhang, 2011), we include offering characteristics such as proceeds amounts (Proceeds), 
underwriter reputation (Top-tier UW), and indicators of the four offering types including 
                                                 
5 We use newspaper strike, or journalist strike, or postman strike as searching key words throughout all the national 
newspaper during 1997-2010. We obtain 5 strikes directly affecting newspaper publishers, including the journalist at a 
national newspaper group are to stage strikes over pay on 04/04/2008; Scottish journalists battle for jobs with strike action 
in April 2009; BBC Journalists’ strike steals headlines on newspaper from 29/10/2010 to 10/11/2010; The newspapers’ 
strike over dismissals in the Mirror occurs on 30/10/2008; Postman’s strike on 09/10/2007. 
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right offers (RO), placing (PL), open offer (OO), and combined offer (PLOO). In addition, 
following prior literature (e.g. Denis, 1994; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Solvin et al. 2000; 
Eckbo et al., 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006; Bowen et al., 2008; Chan and Chan, 2014), 
we also control firm characteristics including institutional ownership (IO) and managerial 
ownership (MSO), issuer size (Size), growth opportunities measured by market-to-book 
ratio (MV/BV), the return on equity (ROE) and leverage ratio (Leverage). We also control 
for dividend yield (Dividend), stock liquidity (Turnover), per-announcement stock 
performance (Pasts), market conditions (Pastm), and analyst coverage (NUM_Analyst). The 
detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
    In this section, we start by providing the institutional setup of SEOs in the UK. Next, 
we show the summary statistics of media related variables. We further present comparisons 
of issues and firm characteristics for SEOs covered by news versus SEOs not reported by 
news. Then, we use OLS and 2SLS regression models to examine whether media coverage 
and sentiment affect firm's offering price discounts. Finally, we explore whether media 
coverage and sentiment influence the value effect of a SEO announcement.  
 
A. Descriptive Statistics  
i. Institutional Features of UK Seasoned Equity Offerings  
Panel A in Table 1 presents the number of SEO deals, along with the average offering 
proceeds across years. We also categorize all SOEs into two groups according to whether 
the issuer is covered by media during the pre-SEO period. We define SEOs whose issuers 
reported by news during the pre-SEO period as SEOs with news, and SEOs whose issuers 
not covered by media during the pre-SEO period as SEOs without news. The number of 
SEOs and annual average offering proceeds fluctuate over the 14 years during our sample 
period. 92 SEO events occurred in 2009, which is the highest number of SEOs during one 
particular year and accounts for 30.16% of the total proceeds raised during our sample 
period. One potential explanation is the UK debt crisis in 2009, when firms found it easier to 
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raise capital via equity issuance than debt. The total number of SEO deals during our sample 
period is 377, among which 43.8% SEO issuers are reported by news (165 SEOs with news 
versus 212 SEOs without news), indicating a bit smaller than a half chance for the issuers to 
appear in news reports before the SEOs are announced to the public. Panel A also report the 
average proceeds per offer during out sample period. The average proceeds for SEOs with 
news are significantly higher than without news (UK £158.42 million versus UK £103.27 
million, respectively). 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the number of SEOs and average proceeds across different 
issue types. In the UK, rights offering (RO), placing (PL), open offering (OO) and a 
combination of open offering with placing (PLOO) are the four most common types of SEOs. 
The distribution reported in Panel B shows that PLs are most likely to be covered by news 
compared with all other three issue types. Since there are potential influences of issue type 
on both media coverage and SEO price discounts, we control issue types in all our models. 
 (Insert Table 1 here) 
 
ii. Summary Statistics of Media Related Variables 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the media related variables during pre-SEO 
period. Panel A includes all SEOs with news in the sample. There are 568media articles 
about SEO issuers during the pre-SEO period, covering 165 SEO deals. On average, each 
SEO with news are reported by 3.442 pieces of news. Both mean and median of media 
sentiment (Sentiment) are positive, which indicates that the number of negative words is on 
average larger than the number of positive words. This finding is consistent with Tetlock et 
al. (2008). One potential reason is that the word list of Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
contains a greater number of negative words than positive words. Another explanation is that 
the psychology literature argues that negative information has a greater influence on 
audience psychology than positive information (Rozin and Royzman, 2001) and thus news 
reporting biases towards negative words. Tetlock (2007) confirms this psychological theory 
by finding that negative words are more likely to be associated with stock returns compared 
with other types of words. 
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In Panel B, we split the sample of SEOs with news into two subgroups according to 
whether there is a newspaper strike happened during a period of 60 days before the SEO 
announcement. We identify 38 SEOs that affected by newspaper strikes. Compared with 
SEOs not affected by newspaper strikes, the newspaper coverage for SEOs affected is 
significantly smaller, consistent with our argument that newspaper strike can directly reduce 
the media coverage. Meanwhile, the sentiment is significantly lower for news influenced by 
the strike, indicating news become less negative around the strike. These results provide 
preliminary support for newspaper strike to be a valid instrument for media related variables.   
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
iii. Descriptive Statistics of Issue and Firm Characteristics 
   Table 3 reports the issue and issuers’ characteristics of UK SEOs, along with the 
comparison between SEOs with news and those without. In Panel A, we report the issue 
characteristics including proceeds (Proceeds), pricing discounts (Discount), market 
reactions around SEO announcements (CAR [-1,+1]), issue types (PL, RO, OO, PLOO), 
and underwriter reputation (Top-tier UW). As reported in panel A of Table 3, the average 
dollar value of proceeds of SEOs with news is UK £150.52 million, whereas for SEOs 
without news, the average proceeds is £92.64 million. These findings suggest that, on 
average, SEOs with news raise more funds than those without. These results are consistent 
with Liu et al. (2009), who find that the IPO offer size is positively related to the level of 
media coverage. The average pricing discount for SEOs in our sample is 12.1%, which is 
similar to the 12% documented by Barnes and Walker (2006) in a UK sample during 1989 
and 1998. The mean of pricing discounts for SEOs with and without news are 8.6% and 
14.5% respectively. The difference between the two groups is insignificant in mean but 
significant at 10% level in median.  
Panel A also presents the descriptive statistics for the market reactions to SEO 
announcements, defined by CAR [-1,+1].6 We find that the average three-day stock return 
                                                 
6 To capture the market reactions to SEO announcements, we use the event study method introduced by Asquith and 
Mullins (1986) and Kang and Stulz (1996). Daily stock returns are computed in logarithmic form and adjusted for dividends. 
We apply the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, with the FTSE All Share equally weighted portfolio as a proxy for the 
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around SEO announcements is -2.31%, significantly different from zero. This result is 
consistent with several theories such as the downward-sloping demand curves, signaling 
effects (Heinkel and Schwartz, 1986; Gao and Ritter, 2010), and asymmetric information 
(Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). The market reactions to the SEO announcements are negative 
for both two subgroups. However, market reacts more negatively to the announcements of 
SEO with news, which provides preliminary support to our hypothesis that media coverage 
during the pre-SEO period is negatively related to SEO announcement returns. In addition, 
we also find SEOs in the type of placing, rather than open offer, and SEOs underwritten by 
top-tier under-writers are more likely to attract media attention. 
Panel B reports the issuers’ characteristics. The results show that issuers of SEOs with 
news tend to have higher institutional ownership (IO) and managerial ownership (MSO) 
compared with SEOs without news. These findings suggest that media is more likely to 
report the firms with higher institutional ownership and managerial ownership. Panel B also 
shows that the average firm size, measured by the market valuation (MV), is significantly 
higher for SEOs with news than for SEOs without news (UK £1266.92 million versus UK 
£771.33 million, respectively). In addition, the average leverage ratio (Leverage) for SEOs 
with news is significantly higher than that for SEOs without news. These results indicate that 
the media is more likely to notice large firms and firms borrowing more debts. Moreover, 
we find that the average turnover of SEOs with news is significantly higher than that of SEOs 
without news, suggesting that stocks actively traded in the capital market attract more 
media attention. 
    We also examine the past cumulative excess returns of SEO issuers, measured by Pasts 
during the period [-60,-2] days prior to the announcement date. As shown in Panel B, the 
average Pasts for all SEOs is 18.01%, which is positive and significant at the 1% level. This 
result is consistent Marsh (1982), who finds that excess returns during the year before the 
SEO are positively related to the probability of issuing equity as an external financing choice. 
We further document a significantly positive cumulative market excess return (Pastm) 
during the pre-SEO period. The difference between two subgroups is insignificant for both 
                                                                                                                                                    
market. The cumulative abnormal returns are generated for the three-day event window around the SEO announcement day. 
The estimated period is set to cover [-260, -61] days prior to the announcement day. 
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Pasts and Pastm. SEOs attracting more media coverage also tend to attract higher analyst 
coverage (NUM_Analyst).  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
B. Media and SEO Price Discount 
Our first set of analyses examines whether and to what degree media coverage and 
sentiment influences SEO offer price. The OLS regression analyses are performed as 
follows: 
1
2 3
( 30, 2) / log(1 ) /Discount News Covergae Sentiment
IssueCharacteristics FirmCharacteristics
D E
E E H
     
              (1) 
Where Discount is SEO price discount, measured as the percentage difference between 
the closing price on the day before the announcement day and the offer price. News (-30,-2) 
is a dummy variable that equals to one if the SEO issuer is covered by news during the 
period of [-30,-2] days prior to the announcement, and zero otherwise. We include offering 
characteristics, issuer characteristics, and market conditions discussed in the previous section 
as control variables.  
To identify the causal relationship between media features and SEO price discounts, we 
adopt the instrumental variable approach and run a 2SLS regression. We use the new paper 
occurrence (NewspaperStrike) as the instrument in the first stage regression.  
1
2 3
( 30, 2) / log(1 )News Covergae NewspaperStrike
IssueCharacteristics FirmCharacteristics
D E
E E H
    
                  (2) 
From the equation (2), we obtain the predicted value of media coverage and apply them 
into the original model shown as follows.7  
                                                 
7 We also try to use newspaper strike as the instrument for news sentiment. However, we fail to find a significant relation 
between the occurrence of newspaper strikes and news sentiment in the multivariable regression. Along with the lack of 
theory in the causality between newspaper strike and news sentiment, we do not use the occurrences of newspaper strikes 
as the instrument for news sentiment. 
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1
2 3
( 30, 2) / log(1 ) /Discount News Coverage Sentiment
IssueCharacteristics FirmCharacteristics
D E
E E H
    
              (3) 
Panel A in Table 4 presents the first-stage regression results of the instrumental 
variable model. The results suggest that the instrument, NewspaperStrike, is strongly 
related to the two measurements of media coverage. Our first measure of media coverage, 
News(-30,-2), is a dummy variable that equals to one is there exists at least one news report 
about the SEO issuer during the pre-SEO period. Our second measure of media coverage is 
a continuous measure, Log(1+Coverage), which is the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of articles covering the SEO issuer during the pre-SEO period. According to 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010), the instrument is tested for the endogeneity/appropriation of 
instrumental variable model (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and partial F-test) and 
over-identification (Sargan Statistic). The F-statistics on the instruments in our first stage 
are all above the critical value from Sargan Statistic over-identification test. Furthermore, 
the first stage R2 is considerably large, i.e. 0.341 for News(-30,-2) and 0.485 for Log 
(1+Coverage), indicating that the chosen instrument is valid for our model. 
Panel B presents the OLS regression results and the second-stage results of instrumental 
variables regression. In Model 1, we estimate the OLS regression by using News(-30,-2) as 
the independent variable and estimate the regression by including all SEO deals.8 The 
coefficient on News(-30,-2) is significantly negative (-0.023, t = -1.68), suggesting a 
negative correlation between media coverage and SEO price discounts. This result remains 
similar by using 2SLS regression and the results are reported in Model 2. In addition, as 
shown in Model 3 to 4, the coefficients on Log(1+Coverage) are negative in both OLS and 
IV regressions, at a significant level from 5% to 10%. These findings suggest that issuers 
with higher media coverage prior to the SEO announcements are likely to have lower SEO 
price discounts, which is consistent with our hypothesis that media coverage during 
pre-SEO period is negatively related to SEO pricing discounts. Media news raises the stock 
publicity among investors and facilitates the dissemination of firm-specific information in 
                                                 
8 In Model 2 to 4, we focus on a constrained sample including only SEOs with news to further mitigate the potential 
endogeneity. Our results remain similar if estimating the regression with all SEO events and set Coverage as zero for 
SEOs without news. The reason why we include only SEOs covered by news in Model 5 is because sentiment can only be 
measured for SEOs with news. 
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the market, and thus, reduces the SEO discounts. 
Model 5 displays the result of the relation between media sentiment and SEO price 
discounts. We note that the coefficient on media sentiment (Sentiment) is positive (0.307) 
and significant at 5% level, suggesting that more negative words in news reports covering 
the issuers leads to higher discounts on the offer price. This result confirms our argument 
that investors’ valuation on the firm is influenced by media sentiment. More optimistic 
media sentiment raises investors’ valuation and encourages more investors to participate in 
the SEO primary market, resulting in a higher offer price and lower price pressure after the 
issue. Similarly, when media sentiment is more pessimistic, the offer price turns out to have a 
higher discount. As for control variables, whenever significant, are consistent with previous 
literature (e.g. Corwin, 2003; Barnes and Walker, 2006; Huang and Zhang, 2011).  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
C. Media and Market Reaction to SEO Announcement 
We next investigate whether media coverage and sentiment affect market responses to 
SEO announcements. We use both the OLS and instrumental variable approach. 
Specifically, we estimate the following two models9: 
1
2 3
( 1, 1) ( 30, 2) / log(1 ) /CAR News Covergae Sentiment
IssueCharacteristics FirmCharacteristics
D E
E E H
      
                 (4) 
1 2
3
( 1, 1) ( 30, 2) / log(1 )CAR News Coverage IssueCharacteristics
FirmCharacteristics
D E E
E H
       
     (5) 
The dependent variable, CAR(-1,+1), is three-day cumulative abnormal return around 
SEO announcements. All the issue and issuer characteristics included are the same as those 
in equation (2) and (3).  
 Table 5 reports the outcome of estimating equation (4) and (5). Notably, we find that the 
coefficients on media coverage (News(-30,-2) and Log(1+Coverage)) are all significantly 
                                                 
9 In the second stage of 2SLS regression, we use the fitted value of media variables estimated by equation (2).  
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negative across Model (1) to (4). These findings suggest that firms with higher media 
attention experience larger value declines upon the SEO announcements. Given that in 
general SEO signals to the market that the firm's current stock price is overvalued, higher 
investor attention attracted by media news exaggerate the negative influences of SEO 
announcements on stock price.  
The estimates for the influences of media sentiment in Model 5 suggest that more 
negative information disseminated by the media will further depress the stock price, leading 
to stronger negative return around SEO announcements. This result is consistent with the 
psychology theory that individual investors influenced by the news content (Tetlock et al., 
2008), which ultimately reflected in their trading activities. The coefficients on control 
variables, whenever significant, are consistent with previous literatures (e.g., Cronqvist and 
Nilsson, 2003; Barnes and Walker, 2006; Ljungqvist et al., 2006; Balachandran et al., 2008) 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
D. Robustness Test of Long-term Effect of the Media 
To further investigate the influences of the media in stock returns involved in SEOs, we 
construct a zero-investment long-short portfolio of stocks sorted by media coverage. As 
before, we divide all SEOs into SEOs with news and SEOs without news. Using the 
cumulative abnormal return, we find that, on average, the portfolio of SEOs with news 
underperforms the portfolio of SEOs without news by 4% in 60 days after SEOs. We draw 
the trend of cumulative abnormal return in 60 days after SEOs in Figure 1. Figure 1 
suggests that the market price reflects the information contained in the SEO announcements 
more precisely when investor recognition is broadened by the mass media, which supports 
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the investor recognition hypothesis (Merton, 1987) and the “no media premium” hypothesis 
(Fang and Peress, 2009). Moreover, the return premium in stocks without news suggests a 
mispricing, and such a mispricing can persist in an incomplete information market. In this 
case, the long-short strategy would generate a positive alpha. This result also supports 
Autore and Kovacs’s (2014) view that greater media coverage as a proxy for improved 
investor recognition, can partially explain the appearance of post-issue stock 
underperformance.   
 We then form a long-short portfolio of SEO stocks sorted by media sentiment. We 
divide SEO stocks with news into two subsamples: SEOs with positive news and SEOs 
with negative news. Figure 2 shows that the return of portfolio of SEO stocks with positive 
news outperforms the portfolio of SEO stocks with negative news by 3.48% over 60 days 
after an SEO and the return trend is likely to be persistent.  
Overall, the results displayed in Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the long run role of media 
in price setting of SEOs. These findings confirm the arguments that media coverage, as a 
proxy of investor attention, and media content, as a proxy for investor sentiment, tend to 
related to a firm's long term equity value.  
(Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here) 
 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper, we document that both media coverage and media sentiment before an SEO 
announcement are significantly related to offering price discounts and market responses to 
the SEO announcements. We measure the media coverage by the existence of news reports, 
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and the total number of news articles related to the issuer during the pre-SEO period. The 
media sentiment is computed as the ratio of negative words minus positive words to the total 
number of words in a news article. 
Our paper yields two main sets of findings. First, media coverage increases investor 
attention and facilities the information dissemination among investors. In the setting of 
SEO pricing, we document lower SEO discounts for issuers covered by news reports and a 
negative correlation between the number of news articles and SEO price discounts. As for 
market reaction to SEO announcements, higher media coverage accelerates the information 
processing of investors and exaggerates the adverse effects of SEO announcements on 
stock price.  
Our second set of findings focus on media sentiment. Our results suggest investor 
decisions are influenced by media sentiment. Specifically, a larger number of negative 
words contained in the news reports increases SEO price discounts, and results in even 
more negative market reaction to the SEO announcements. Meanwhile, more optimistic 
media news neutralizes the negative market reaction to SEO announcements. These 
findings support the conjecture that media sentiment has an important impact on investor 
sentiment (e.g. Shiller, 2005; Tetlock, 2007). Furthermore, the results in robustness test 
show that the lower return around SEO announcements predicted by greater media 
coverage and more pessimistic news tends to be persistent in a window of 60 days after 
SEO. 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on the media's role in asset pricing and 
investor behavior. By using a UK sample, we provide strong evidence that media influences 
price discounts and market responses to SEOs. We note that not only the media coverage 
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but also the news contents have impacts on investors. 
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Appendix: Variables Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Media features   
News(-30,-2) 
 
Dummy variable that equals one for the SEO firms that are covered by 
media news during a period from 30 days to 2 day before the 
announcement day, and zero otherwise.  
LexisNexis UK 
Coverage  Total number of media articles related to issuers during the pre-SEO 
period. Log(1+Coverage) is the natural logarithm of one plus Coverage. 
LexisNexis UK 
Log(1+Coverage) The natural logarithm of 1 plus media coverage LexisNexis UK 
Sentiment  Sentiment is calculated as the mean of the sentiment per article during the 
pre-SEO period, where sentiment per article is defined as the ratio of 
(Negative words-Positive words) to Total words. 
LexisNexis UK 
Issue characteristics 
Discount 1- Offer price/Closing market price on the day before the announcement 
day. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Proceeds Gross proceeds. For missing data, the value is constructed as the number 
of new shares times the offer price. Log(Proceeds) is the natural logarithm 
of gross proceeds. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Top-tier UW  Dummy variable that equals one if the equity issue is underwritten by one 
of top-8 underwriters according to the value of the equity issue during the 
sample period (1998 to 2010), and zero otherwise. The top-8 underwriters 
are Goldman Sachs, Cazenove and Co, Merrill Lynch (now Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch), UBS Investment Bank, JP Morgan, Credit Suisse, 
RBS Hoare Govett Ltd, Deutsche Bank. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
RO Dummy variable that equals one for a rights offer, and zero otherwise. Thomson One 
Banker 
PL Dummy variable that equals one for placing, and zero otherwise. Thomson One 
Banker 
OO Dummy variable that equals one for an open offer, and zero otherwise. Thomson One 
Banker 
PLOO Dummy variable that equals one for the combined offer of placing-open 
offer, and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Firm characteristics 
IO Institutional ownership comprises aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the 
firm's share stakes held by all institutional investors. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
MSO Managerial share ownership, defined as the sum of the ownership of 
executive and non-executive directors. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
MV The issuer's market value. Datastream 
Size The natural logarithm of market value. Datastream 
ROE The ratio of net income over the book value of equity. Datastream 
MV/BV The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. Datastream 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets. Datastream 
Dividend  The cash dividend on stock price. Datastream 
Turnover  Monthly moving average turnover ratio estimated during a period of [-60, 
-2] days prior to announcement day, where turnover ratio is daily trading 
volume divided by the number of share outstanding. 
Datastream 
CAR(-1,+1) Cumulative abnormal returns for the SEO issuer in the 3-day event 
window (-1,+1) around  the announcement day. The returns are 
calculated using the Carhart four factor model (1997) with the market 
model parameters estimated over the period of [-260,-61] days prior to 
the announcement day.  
Datastream 
Pasts  Past stock performance, defined as the cumulative abnormal return for 
SEO firms during the estimated period of [-60, -2] prior to the 
announcement day. 
Datastream 
Pastm Past market performance, defined as the cumulative equal-weighted 
market returns during the estimated period of [-60, -2] prior to 
announcement day. 
Datastream 
NUM_Analyst  The number of analyst reports over firm within the period of [-60, -2] 
days prior to announcement day. Log (1+ NUM_Analyst) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus NUM_Analyst. 
IBES 
Instrumental variable for media coverage 
NewspaperStrike Dummy variable that equals one if newspaper related strike occurs 
during a period of [-30, -2] prior to SEO announcement day. 
LexisNexis UK 
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Table 1: Institutional Features of UK SEOs 
The table presents the numbers and the average proceeds of SEOs across years between 1998 and 2010. 
We exclude utilities and financials listed on the LSE during the sample period.  Proceeds are reported in 
millions of British pounds. All SEOs are separated into two groups: SEOs whose issuers covered by 
media news during the pre-SEO period (SEOs with news) and SEOs whose issuers not covered by 
media news during the pre-SEO period (SEOs without news). The pre-SEO period lasts from 30 days 
before the announcement date to 2 days before the announcement date. All media articles are collected 
from the LexisNexis UK. Our sample comprises all news articles from the Financial Times (London), 
The Times (London), Guardian (London), Mirror and Sunday Mirror.  
 
Panel A SEOs distribution across years 
 All SEOs SEOs with news SEOs without news 
 N 
Average 
Proceeds N 
Average 
Proceeds N 
Average 
Proceeds 
1998 13 140.91 8 186.34 5 68.21 
1999 11 189.58 9 210.88 2 93.71 
2000 37 120.74 20 160.51 17 73.95 
2001 39 71.89 21 62.78 18 82.73 
2002 24 104.77 9 202.68 15 46.03 
2003 29 95.24 9 88.60 20 99.19 
2004 39 66.00 11 117.85 28 42.97 
2005 30 102.29 11 105.38 19 100.49 
2006 28 111.83 14 148.59 14 75.05 
2007 19 194.33 8 233.03 11 166.19 
2008 11 155.37 5 180.85 6 134.15 
2009 92 186.80 39 211.51 53 168.61 
2010 5 51.93 1 47.69 4 52.99 
Full Sample 377 127.55 165 158.42 212 103.27 
 
Panel B SEOs distribution across issue types 
PL 107 142.74 63 166.11 44 109.29 
RO 132 134.50 54 160.07 78 116.80 
OO 32 69.15 8 104.69 24 57.31 
PLOO 106 121.39 40 154.83 66 101.12 
Full Sample 377 127.55 165 158.42 212 103.63 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Media Related Variables 
This table presents the summary statistics of the media related variables for the UK SEOs with news 
from 1998 to 2010. All news articles are collected from the LexisNexis UK, comprising all news articles 
from the Financial Times (London), The Times (London), Guardian (London), Mirror and Sunday 
Mirror. An SEO is classified as SEO with news if its issuer is covered by news during the pre-SEO 
period. Panel A includes all SEOs with news. Panel B divides the sample of SEOs with news into two 
subgroups according to whether they are affected by a newspaper strike a period of 60 days before the 
SEO announcement. All definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
test is used to test the difference in means and medians. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A All SEOs with news (N=165) 
  Mean Median Std. 10
th 90th 
Coverage  3.442 3.000 2.507 1.000 8.000 
Sentiment (%)  1.649 1.300 1.014 0.444 3.443 
 
Panel B Comparison of SEOs with news affected by newspaper strikes and those not affected 
 Not Affected by  Newspaper Strike (N=127) 
Affected by  
Newspaper Strike (N=38) Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median p-value Mean Diff. 
p-value 
Median Diff. 
Coverage 3.776 3.000 2.339 2.000 0.000 0.000 
Sentiment (%) 1.675 1.379 1.562 1.262 0.043 0.037 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Issue and Firm Characteristics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for a sample of 377 UK SEOs from 1998 to 2010. Issue 
characteristics and issuer characteristics are reported in Panel A and B, respectively. All SEOs are 
separated into two groups: SEOs with news (N=165) and SEOs without (N=212). An SEO is classified 
as SEO with news if its issuer is covered by news during the pre-SEO period. All definitions of 
variables are provided in the Appendix. Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to test the difference in 
means and medians between two groups, SEO with news and SEO without news. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 All SEOs SEOs with news (1) SEOs without news (2) Difference (1)-(2) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
p-value 
Mean 
p-value 
Median 
Panel A Issue characteristics 
Proceeds (£mil) 122.44 69.25 150.52 83.67 92.64 54.28 0.000 0.000 
Discount 0.121 0.202 0.086 0.188 0.145 0.222 0.147 0.085 
CAR [-1,+1] (%) -2.307 -0.144 -4.344 -0.090 -0.720 -0.327 0.010 0.018 
PL 0.284 0.000 0.382 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RO 0.350 0.000 0.327 0.000 0.368 0.000 0.413 0.412 
OO 0.085 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.026 0.026 
PLOO 0.281 0.000 0.242 0.000 0.311 0.000 0.141 0.130 
Top-tier UW 0.621 0.000 0.679 0.000 0.575 0.000 0.041 0.041 
Panel B Firm characteristics 
IO (%) 37.316 32.390 34.486 29.360 39.519 33.915 0.059 0.193 
MSO (%) 6.652 1.750 4.795 1.750 8.096 1.610 0.026 0.720 
MV (£ mil) 988.24 655.65 1266.92 941.74 771.34 450.77 0.000 0.000 
ROE (%) 7.280 4.100 13.037 5.140 2.800 4.070 0.947 0.375 
MV/BV 3.176 2.010 3.676 1.960 2.787 2.055 0.074 0.140 
Leverage (%) 26.681 25.068 28.861 26.478 24.984 25.068 0.098 0.072 
Dividend (%) 7.260 3.890 8.375 3.890 6.393 3.990 0.188 0.065 
Turnover (%) 0.585 0.410 0.717 0.462 0.482 0.374 0.002 0.082 
Pasts (%) 18.008 11.282 22.395 13.476 14.594 9.574 0.138 0.142 
Pastm (%) 8.496 11.606 7.953 10.733 8.919 12.285 0.747 0.342 
NUM_Analyst 2.984 2.000 3.644 2.000 2.470 2.000 0.077 0.215 
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Table 4: Media and SEO Price Discount  
This table presents the regression results of SEO price discounts on media coverage and sentiment for 
UK SEOs from 1998 to 2010. Panel A presents the first stage-regression results of instrumental variable 
approach. News(-30,-2) and Log(1+Coverage) are respectively predicted by the instrumental variable, 
NewspaperStrike, along with other firm-level control variables. In Panel B, Model 1, 3 and 5 report the 
results of baseline OLS regression. And Model 2 and 4 report the second-stage regression results of 
instrumental variable approach, where News(-30,-2) and Log(1+Coverage) are the fitted value 
estimated by the first-stage regression. All definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. All 
firm variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All regressions include year and 
industry fixed effect. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A First-Stage regression of instrumental variable approach 
 1 2 
 News(-30,-2) Log(1+Coverage) 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Intercept -0.183 -1.44 -1.406*** -4.01 
IV: NewspaperStrike -0.561***  -9.45 -1.883 *** -11.47 
Issue Characteristics         
Log(Proceed) 0.016 0.78 0.039 0.68 
Top-tier UW 0.065 1.28 0.08 0.57 
PL 0.018 0.33 0.027 0.18 
RO -0.117**  -1.99 -0.104 -0.64 
OO -0.14 -1.48 -0.272 -1.05 
Firm characteristics     IO -0.006 -0.23 -0.135* -1.93 
MSO 0.010 0.41 0.059 0.87 
Size 0.054***  2.85 0.266*** 5.10 
ROE -0.018 -0.81 -0.101 -1.60 
MV/BV -0.195 -0.32 3.359** 2.02 
Leverage -0.323**  -2.08 -0.647 -1.51 
Dividend 0.149 0.65 0.489 0.78 
Turnover 0.003 0.11 0.034 0.49 
Pasts -0.005 -0.19 -0.119* -1.83 
Pastm -0.011 -0.47 -0.051 -0.75 
Log(1+NUM_Analyst) -0.076 -0.79 -0.127 -0.48 
Partial F-statistics 11.37  19.87  Adjust-R2 0.341  0.485  N 377  377  
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Table 4 (cont’d) 
Panel B OLS regression results and second-stage of instrumental variable approach 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 OLS Second Stage (IV) OLS Second Stage (IV) OLS 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Intercept 0.634*** 10.43 0.612*** 9.65 0.602*** 9.74 0.592 *** 8.88 0.727 8.03 
Media Features           News(-30,-2) -0.023* -1.68 -0.085* -1.65       Log(1+Coverage)     -0.020** -2.53 -0.025* -1.68   Sentiment         0.307** 2.05 Issue Characteristics           Log(Proceed) 0.018* 1.84 0.019** 1.87 0.018* 1.86 0.018** 1.86 0.009* 1.97 
Top-tier UW -0.088*** -3.64 -0.087 *** -3.56 -0.090*** -3.76 -0.090*** -3.77 -0.112*** -3.39 
PL 0.088*** 3.26 0.090*** 3.31 0.088*** 3.29 0.088*** 3.30 0.076** 2.00 
RO 0.002 0.06 0.012 0.41 0.004 0.13 0.005 0.18 -0.019 -0.52 
OO -0.051 -1.13 -0.062 -1.33 -0.055 -1.22 -0.057 -1.26 -0.212 -1.37 
Firm characteristics           IO -0.035*** -2.87 -0.036*** -2.92 -0.032 -2.70 -0.032 -2.64 -0.017 ** -2.36 
MSO 0.009** 2.25 0.009** 2.08 0.008** 2.27 0.008** 2.20 0.002** 2.07 
Size -0.058*** -6.34 -0.052*** -5.15 -0.052*** -5.55 -0.050*** -4.71 -0.068*** -5.90 
ROE 0.009 0.79 0.009 0.77 0.008 0.72 0.008 0.69 0.021 1.01 
MV/BV -0.944*** -3.27 -0.943*** -3.24 -0.862*** -2.99 -0.842*** -2.88 -0.685** -2.07 
Leverage 0.081 1.09 0.051 0.64 0.068 0.92 0.062 0.82 0.079 0.82 
Dividend 0.458*** 4.22 0.451*** 4.11 0.452*** 4.21 0.450*** 4.18 0.557*** 4.04 
Turnover -0.016 -1.31 -0.018 -1.46 -0.018 -1.49 -0.018 -1.53 -0.001 -0.09 
Pasts -0.026** -2.31 -0.025** -2.21 -0.028** -2.46 -0.028** -2.48 -0.028* -1.78 
Pastm 0.016** 2.41 0.017** 2.46 0.017** 2.45 0.018** 2.28 0.032* 1.73 
Log(1+ NUM_Analyst) -0.082* -1.78 -0.089* -1.90 -0.079* -1.74 -0.079* -1.74 -0.067* -1.75 
Adjust-R2 0.311  0.309  0.322  0.317  0.413  N 377  165  165  165  165   
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Table 5: Media and Market Reaction to SEO Announcement  
This table presents the regression results of the market reaction around SEO announcements on media features for UK SEOs from 1998 to 2010. Models 1, 3 and 5 show the 
results of baseline OLS regression. Models 2 and 4 report the second-stage regression results of instrumental variable approach, where News(-30,-2) and Log(1+Coverage) is 
the fitted value from the first-stage regression. All definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. All firm variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. 
All regressions include year and industry fixed effect. t-statistics for the chi-squared test statistic is also shown in the table. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 OLS Second Stage (IV) OLS Second Stage (IV) OLS 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Intercept -0.038* -1.87 -0.048* -1.93 -0.045* -1.94 -0.045* -1.94 -0.032 -1.00 
Media Features           News (-30,-2) -0.010*** -2.87 -0.049*** -2.75       Log (1+coverage)     -0.008*** -2.93 -0.008*** -2.93   Sentiment         -0.860* -1.87 Issue Characteristics           Discount -0.001** -1.97 -0.006** -2.13 -0.007* -1.93 -0.007* -1.93 -0.058** -2.57 
Log(Proceed) 0.002 0.56 0.002 0.65 0.002 0.60 0.002 0.60 0.002 0.49 
Top-tier UW 0.021** 2.48 0.021** 2.42 0.019** 2.34 0.019** 2.34 0.027*** 2.63 
PL 0.018 1.59 0.016 1.56 0.018 1.42 0.018 1.40 0.018 1.61 
RO -0.012** -2.01 -0.019* -1.83 -0.013* -1.72 -0.013 -1.35 -0.024 -1.13 
OO 0.012 0.80 0.005 0.34 0.011 0.71 0.011 0.71 0.014 0.70 
Firm characteristics           IO 0.002 0.51 0.003 0.69 0.001 0.34 0.001 0.34 0.002 0.41 
MSO -0.012*** -3.15 -0.012*** -2.96 -0.012*** -3.11 -0.012*** -3.11 -0.001* -1.66 
Size 0.006* 1.87 0.009** 2.58 0.008** 2.42 0.008** 2.42 0.005* 1.73 
ROE -0.005 -1.37 -0.005 -1.34 -0.005 -1.47 -0.005 -1.47 -0.006 -1.40 
MV/BV 0.045 0.46 0.041 0.40 0.071 0.73 0.071 0.73 0.173 0.96 
Leverage -0.029* -1.72 -0.048* -1.77 -0.033* -1.72 -0.033* -1.71 -0.117*** -2.69 
Dividend 0.064 1.16 0.066 1.18 0.063 1.35 0.063 1.35 0.028 0.95 
Turnover -0.004 -0.88 -0.002 -0.53 -0.003 -0.68 -0.003 -0.68 -0.001 -0.33 
Pasts 0.022*** 5.8 0.022*** 5.50 0.023*** 6.06 0.023*** 6.06 0.013*** 3.07 
Pastm 0.013*** 3.22 0.013*** 3.24 0.013*** 3.31 0.013*** 3.31 0.007 1.31 
Log(1+ NUM_Analyst) -0.007 -0.46 -0.012 -0.72 -0.006 -0.41 -0.006 -0.41 -0.015 -0.86 
Adjust-R2 0.158  0.160  0.176  0.176  0.129  N 377  165  165  165  165  
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Figure1: CAR of SEOs with News vs. SEOs without News 
This figure presents the cumulative average abnormal returns for two groups, SEOs with news (N=165) 
and SEOs without news (N=212). The sample period starts from 01/01/1998 to 31/12/2010. The portfolio 
holding period covers [0,+60] days after SEOs, where Day0 is the announcement date.  
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Figure2: CAR of SEOs with Positive News vs. SEOs with Negative News 
This figure presents the cumulative average abnormal returns for two groups: SEOs with positive news 
(N=82) and SEOs with negative news (N=83). The sample period starts from 01/01/1998 to 31/12/2010. 
The portfolio holding period covers [0,+60] days after SEOs, where Day0 is the announcement date. 
 
 
